Abstract. Robots are increasingly used to perform a wide variety of tasks, especially those involving dangerous or inaccessible locations. As the complexity of such tasks grow, robots are being deployed in teams, with complex coordination schemes aimed at maximizing the chance of mission success. Such teams operate under inherently uncertain conditions -the robots themselves fail, and have to continuously adapt to changing environmental conditions. A key challenge facing robotic mission designers is therefore to construct a mission -i.e., specify number and type of robots, number and size of teams, coordination and planning mechanisms etc. -so as to maximize some overall utility, such as probability of mission success. In this paper, we advocate, formalize, and empirically justify an approach to compute quantitative utility of robotic missions using probabilistic model checking. We show how to express a robotic demining mission as a restricted type of discrete time Markov chain (called αPA), and its utility as either a linear temporal logic formula or a reward. We prove a set of compositionality theorems that enable us to compute the utility a system composed of several αPAs by combining the utilities of each αPA in isolation. This ameliorates the statespace explosion problem, even when the system being verified is composed of a larger number of robots. We validate our approach empirically, using the probabilistic model checker prism.
Introduction
Robots are increasingly used to perform a wide variety of tasks. Examples include situations where the task is dangerous (e.g., demining) or involves physically inaccessible localities (e.g., a disaster area). In both types of cases, robots are often deployed in teams to provide fault tolerance, and to accommodate a wider variety of plans. The tasks consist of both unpredictable and known parts. For example, the operating conditions change unpredictably, and robots might malfunction, become indisposed, or be unable to complete its task due to the lack of capability. These are unknown. On the other hand, there are known parameters, e.g., the number of robots, the capabilities of each robot, the set of plans available to each robot, and the coordination algorithms used by the robots, that are within the control of the mission designer. The goal of the designer is to select these parameters so as to increase overall mission utility.
We focus a specific class of missions that involve foraging-and-reacting (FAR), where robots have to explore an arena, look for specific objects, and react to them in specific ways. Examples of such missions are demining a minefield [16] where robots attempt to defuse detected mines, and search-and-rescue of a disaster area where robots report the location and status of discovered survivors to authorities.
Designing FAR missions requires solving two types of problems: (a) success: estimate the probability of mission success within a certain deadline; and (b) coverage: compute the expected amount of terrain covered within a given deadline. Currently, designers rely on their prior knowledge as well as field tests and simulations to solve these two problems. Both have limitations. Relying on prior knowledge is ad-hoc, limited, and typically does not cover unknown and unforeseen situations. Full scale field tests are expensive, time-consuming, and may not be conducted in a way that permits a generalization of the relative impacts of certain parameter settings to similar missions in other contexts.
In this paper, we propose a more systematic, repeatable, and analytic method, based on probabilistic model checking, to solve both success and coverage problems. Specifically, we show how to model a robotic demining mission as a probabilistic automaton (PA). In addition, we show how to express success as a probabilistic LTL [1] formula, and coverage as a cumulative reward over the PA. This is our first contribution. Further details are presented in Section 5.
Our second contribution is tackling the statespace explosion problem during probabilistic model checking of FAR missions. We leverage two types of restrictions commonly found in such missions. First, robots are divided into teams, and each team operates independently on a separate portion of the arena. We call this property independence (IND). Second, the PAs for the teams synchronize over a common action corresponding to a clock tick since the robot teams operate under the same global clock. We call property synchronization (SYNC). In our approach, these two restrictions are incorporated by modeling each team as a αPA, i.e., a PA with a singleton alphabet {α}. When αPAs are composed, they synchronize over the common action α. The result is also a αPA.
The restricted nature of αPAs enables us to obtain two compositionality results: (a) probability of satisfying an LTL formula accumulates multiplicatively over αPAs (cf. Theorem 1 and 2); and (b) expected reward accumulates additively over αPA (cf. Theorem 3 and 4). Our compositionality theorems hold for an arbitrary (but finite) number of αPAs. Further details are presented in Section 4. These theorems enable us to solve success and coverage for our demining case study in a completely compositional manner by model checking the αPA for each team individually.
Our third and final contribution is an empirical validation of our results by using the state-of-the-art probabilistic model checker prism [11] to compute the values of success and coverage for our demining case study using both the compositional approach and the direct non-compositional approach. We show how the non-compositional model checking runs out of resources even for two robotic teams, while the compositional approach scales easily to even thirty teams. Further details are presented in Section 6.
The rest of the paper is structures as follows. In Section 2 we survey related work. In Section 3, we present basic definitions. In Section 4 we present our compositionality theorems. In Section 5, we present our robotic demining scenario and its αPA model, as well as the properties we want to verify. In Section 6, we present experimental results, and in Section 7, we conclude.
Related Work
This paper builds on a wide body of work in modeling and verifying probabilistic systems [14] . In particular, probabilistic model checking has been used to verify systems ranging from pacemakers [3] , root contention protocols [13] and biological pathways [8] . Our work explores the application of probabilistic model checking to yet another domain -coordinated multi-robot missions.
The connection between probabilistic systems and compositionality has been studied by a number of researchers. For example, de Alfaro et al. [4] provide a semantic notion of compositionality in the context of probabilistic reactive modules. Our notion of probabilistic automata and parallel composition is borrowed from that proposed by Stoelinga [15] and others. In essence, αPA are a restricted, yet useful, version of probabilistic automata that admit to strong compositionality results.
A number of projects on compositional verification of probabilistic systems [12] use automated assume-guarantee algorithms that are based on learning [6, 7] . There is also work on learning-based assume-guarantee reasoning for synchronous probabilistic systems [5] , assume-guarantee and abstraction refinement for probabilistic systems [9] , and on compositional reasoning for probabilistic model checking of hardware designs [10] . Our approach is also compositional, but does not involve assume-guarantee reasoning.
A preliminary version of the demining scenario presented here, its probabilistic model, and experimental results were reported in our previous work [2] . The model was less elaborate, e.g., it did not include uncertainty when moving from cell to cell. Also, it was a DTMC, not αPA, and hence not amenable to the compositionality theorems presented here. Indeed, our prior work [2] did not include any compositionality theorems, nor empirical results showing their effectiveness.
Preliminaries
We adopt the formalism of probabilistic automata [15] , modifying it in two ways: (a) extending it by labeling states with atomic propositions; and (b) restricting the alphabet to be a singleton. The result is a class of automata we call αPA. Let Dist(X) be the set of all probability distributions over any set X.
Definition 1 (αPA).
A αPA is a 6-tuple (S, Init, Σ, δ, AP , L) where: (i) S is a set of states; (ii) Init ∈ S is the initial state; (iii) Σ = {α} is the singleton alphabet; (iv) δ : S → Dist(S) is the transition relation; (v) AP is a set of atomic propositions; and (vi) L : S → 2 AP is a mapping from states to sets of atomic propositions, such that L(s) is the set of propositions true in s.
, and L(M ) to mean S, Init, Σ, δ, AP and L, respectively. Definition 2 (Execution). Let M be a αPA. An execution π is a (finite or infinite) sequence of states s 0 , s 1 , . . . such that:
The execution π starts from s 0 . The set of all executions starting from s is denoted by Ex (s, M ), and Ex (M ) means Ex (Init(M ), M ). The set of all finite executions starting from s is denoted by Ex (s, M ) and Ex (M ) means Ex (Init(M ), M ). We omit M from Ex (s, M ) and Ex (s, M ) when it is clear from the context.
Given two probability distributions µ 1 ∈ Dist(X 1 ) and µ 2 ∈ Dist(X 2 ), the distribution (µ 1 × µ 2 ) ∈ Dist(X 1 × X 2 ) is defined as follows:
For any set X and an element x ∈ X, the Dirac distribution ∆(x) ∈ Dist(X) maps x to 1 and every other element of X to 0. αPAs synchronize via the common action α. Let M 1 and M 2 be two αPAs. We write
Formally, the composition of αPA is defined as follows.
Properties. We assume that properties are specified as LTL [1] formulas. The syntax of a LTL formula Ψ over the set of atomic propositions AP is given by:
where a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition. We write π |= Ψ to mean that the infinite execution π satisfies the formula Ψ . Consider a PA M . We write Ex (s, Ψ ) to mean the infinite executions starting from s that satisfy Ψ , i.e.,
Cylinders. Every finite execution π induces a set of infinite executions for which π is a prefix. This is known as the cylinder of π, or Cyl( π). A finite execution π satisfies Ψ , denoted π |= Ψ , if ∀π ∈ Cyl( π) π |= Ψ . We write π 1 π 2 to mean that π 1 is a prefix of π 2 . A set of finite executions E is minimal if it has no two distinct elements π 1 and π 2 such that π 1 π 2 . For every LTL formula Ψ and state s, there is a unique minimal subset of Ex (s), denoted B(s, Ψ ), such that:
Let Ex (s, k) be the subset of Ex (s) containing only executions with k + 1 states. Let π = s 0 , . . . , s n ∈ Ex (s 0 , n). Let us define p( π) as follows:
Definition 4. Given a state s and a LTL formula Ψ , P(s, Ψ ) is the probability that s satisfies Ψ , and is defined as:
Rewards. We write P(M, Ψ ) to mean P(Init(M ), Ψ ). A reward structure on a αPA M is a pair (ρ, ι) such that ρ : S(M ) → R and ι : S(M ) × S(M ) → R map states and transitions of M , respectively, to real-valued rewards.
Definition 5. The cumulative reward due to a reward structure R = (ρ, ι) from state s upto time k, denoted by C ≤k (s, R) is defined recursively as follows:
Compositional Verification
In this section, we present our compositionality theorems. We begin by defining the "product" of two executions. Let M 1 ∈ αPA and M 2 ∈ αPA. Let π 1 = s 0 , . . . , s n ∈ Ex (M 1 , n) and π 2 = s 0 , . . . , s n ∈ Ex (M 2 , n) be two finite executions.
, then we write π 1 and π 2 to mean π 1 and π 2 , respectively. This extends to executions of different length as follows. Given a finite execution π = s 0 , . . . , s m , and n ≥ m, the set of n-extensions of π, denoted by π +n , is defined as follows:
Note that if π ∈ π 1 × π 2 , then π 1 π 1 and π 2 π 2. Next we present two lemmas. The proofs of these lemmas are in the appendix.
, and Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 be LTL formulas over AP (M 1 ) and AP (M 2 ), respectively. Then:
Lemma 2. Let E 1 and E 2 be two minimal sets of finite executions. Then:
Now we present and prove our first compositionality theorem.
and Ψ 2 be LTL formulas over AP (M 1 ) and AP (M 2 ), respectively. Then:
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows:
using Definition 4
Theorem 1 generalizes from 2 to n αPAs as follows.
We omit the proof of Theorem 2 for brevity, and turn our attention to rewards. Let M 1 and M 2 be αPAs and let R 1 = (ρ 1 , ι 1 ) and R 2 = (ρ 2 , ι 2 ) be reward structures defined on them. The composition of R 1 and R 2 , denoted by R 1 ⊕ R 2 , is the reward structure (ρ, ι) on M 1 M 2 defined as follows:
Our second compositionality theorem relates to rewards, as stated next.
Theorem 3. Let M 1 ∈ αPA, M 2 ∈ αPA be αPAs such that M 1 M 2 . Let R 1 and R 2 be reward structures M 1 and M 2 , respectively. Then:
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. If k = 0, then it follows from Definition 5.
using Definition 5
expanding ρ and ι and applying inductive hypothesis
Theorem 3 generalizes from 2 to n αPAs as follows.
. . , R n be reward structures over M 1 , . . . , M n , respectively. Then:
We omit the proof of Theorem 4 for brevity. The power of Theorems 2 and 4 is that they enable compositional verification of αPAs. Specifically, Theorem 2 enables us to compute probabilities satisfying a conjunctive LTL formula on the composition of several αPAs from the probabilities of satisfying individual conjuncts on each component αPA. Similarly, Theorem 4 enables us to compute rewards on the composition of several αPAs from the individual rewards on each component αPA. This avoids having to computes the reachable statespace of the composed αPA, and therefore the statespace explosion.
In the next section, we present an example that is compositionally verifiable using Theorem 2 and Theorem 4. After that, in Section 6, we present empirical evidence about the improvement is verification due to the compositionality enabled by Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
The Scenario: Robotic Demining
We consider a two-dimensional area (modeled as a grid of cells with Row rows and Col columns) randomly seeded with mines. Robots are organized into T teams, each comprising of N robots. The teams sweep the area, detect each mine, and either defuse it or (failing which) mark it. The mission succeeds if all mines are detected and defused (or marked) within a specified deadline D. The mission is parameterized not only by Row, Col, T , N , and D, but also the capabilities of each robot, the terrain, and coordination algorithm used by the robots. We first describe how each team is modeled as a αPA.
Modeling a Team
Each team has a pre-defined initial cell cInit, final cell cFinal , and a path plan P that dictates how to move cell-to-cell from cInit to cFinal . At any point, the team has a leader, and zero or more followers. In each cell, the team (specifically, the leader) first attempts to sense a mine. If a mine is detected, the leader attempts to defuse it. On successful defusing, the team moves on to the next cell according to its path plan P . If defusing fails, then the cell is first marked as being mined, and then the team moves on to the next cell according to its path plan P . If the (a) (b) Fig. 1. (a) αPA for a team, and its decomposition into sub-αPAs M cell and Mstep; (b) αPA Mstep; transitions are numbered for ease of reference, and labeled by associated probabilities (green), guards (black) and commands (red); t k = transition number k; true guards and implied probabilities are omitted for brevity, e.g., the probability of t1 is 1.0, the guard of t5 is true, and the probability of t12 is (1 − p skip). Note that Y MIN=0 and Y MAX=Row-1. All transitions are labeled by action tick, i.e., α = tick. mine explodes (thereby destroying the leader) the followers elect a new leader using a pre-defined leader election algorithm. We are concerned with several sources of uncertainty in this scenario:
1. Due to the terrain and the quality of the leader's sensing capability, it fails to detect a mine. 2. Due to the terrain, the time required to defuse a mine varies. 3. Due to the quality of the leader's defusing capability, the mine explodes while it is being defused. 4. Due to the quality of the leader's marking capability, the mine explodes while the cell is being marked. 5. Due to communication problems, the leader election algorithm fails. 6. Due to the terrain and the team's locomotion capability, the team fails to move to the next cell in its path plan.
To express these uncertainties as part of the team's behavior, we model each team as a αPA. The αPA is composed of two sub-αPAs -M cell corresponding to the team's behavior within a cell, and M step corresponding to the team's locomotion from the current cell to the next. Figure 1(a) shows the overall αPA for a team, and its decomposition into the two sub-αPAs M cell and M step . The initial state is INIT, and the αPA ends up in one of three possible end-states -DONE indicates that the team has covered all cells; STUCK indicates that the team is unable to move to its next cell; BLOWNUP indicates that the team has been destroyed by exploding mines.
αPA M step . We assume that the teams follow a pre-determined path through the grid. Specifically, if there is a single team (i.e., T = 1), then it follows the path shown in Fig. 2(a) . If T > 1, then each team operates independently on a distinct fragment of the path that is pre-allocated to it. For example, if T = 4, the starting and ending cells, and the path of each team is shown in Fig. 2(b) . Figure 1(b) shows the αPA M step . The team maintains: (a) its current position in the grid -using variables x and y which are initialized to values (X INIT and Y INIT, respectively) corresponding to cInit; and (b) the direction of movement -using variable dir which is initialized according to P and takes two possible values UP and DOWN. All transitions are labeled by the action tick.
Let t k mean transition number k in Figure 1(b) . From the initial state NEXT, the team first checks if it has reached cFinal . In this case (t 1 ), the team moves to state DONE and stutters (t 14 ). Otherwise, the team attempts to move to the next cell (t 2 ). This involves two cases: (a) the team moves to the next column (t 3 ) which involves two turns (t 5 , t 7 ), a skip (t 6 ), and a change in direction; or (b) the team moves to the next row (t 4 ) which involves just a skip (t 11 ). Skips and turns succeed with probability p skip and p turn, respectively. These probabilities are determined by the terrain and the team's locomotion capability, as discussed later. If a skip or a turn fails, the team moves to a STUCK state (t 8 , t 9 , t 10 , t 12 ) and stutters (t 13 ).
αPA M cell . The αPA M cell is shown in Fig. 3 . We model whether a mine was missed using variable failed, initialized to false. We also model the number of Fig. 3 . αPA M cell ; transitions are numbered and labeled, and guards and probabilities are omitted as in Figure 1(b) ; states LEADER and NEXT are repeated to reduce clutter; all transitions are labeled by action tick, i.e., α = tick.
remaining robots in the team using variable sz, initialized to N . In the following, t k means the transition labeled k in Fig. 3 . The teams begins in state INIT and the leader attempts to detect a mine. The result of mine detection is either an explosion with probability p explode detect (t 2 ), a mine found with probability p detect mine (t 1 ), or no mine found (t 3 ).
If no mine was detected (state NOT DETECTED), then we assume that with probability p false neg, there is actually a mine. In this case, with equal likelihood, the leader either explodes (t 4 ) or the team moves to the next cell (t 5 ). In the latter case, we indicate mission failure (since a mine has been missed) by setting failed to true. Finally, with probability (1 -p false neg), the team moves to the next cell (t 6 ), continuing with its mission. The probability p false neg is a function of the leader's detecting capability and the terrain, as discussed later.
If a mine was detected, the leader attempts to defuse it. We assume that the leader is in one of three defusing situations with increasing difficulty -easy, medium and hard. Initially (DEFUSE1), the leader assumes that it is in the easy defusing situation. The result is either an explosion with probability (p d1 × p ed1) (t 8 ), successful defusing of the mine with probability (p d1 × (1 − p ed1)) (t 7 ), or a decision to move on to the medium defusing scenario (t 9 ). Here, p d1 is the probability that the leader is actually in an easy defusing situation, and p ed1 is the probability that there is an explosion given that the leader is trying to defuse in an easy situation. As discussed later, while p d1 is a function of the terrain, p ed1 is a function of the leader's defusing capability.
In the medium defusing scenario (DEFUSE2), the leader either blows up (t 11 ), successfully defuses the mine (t 10 ), or moves to the hard defusing scenario (t 12 ). The probabilities involved in this step are: p d2 -the terrain-dependent probability that the leader is actually in a medium defusing situation, and p ed2 -the probability (dependent on the leader's defusing capability) that there is an explosion given that it is trying to defuse in a medium situation.
In the hard defusing scenario (DEFUSE3), the leader either blows up (t 14 ), successfully defuses the mine (t 13 ), or attempts to mark the cell (t 15 ) as being mined. The probabilities involved in this step are: p d3 -the terrain-dependent probability that the leader is actually in a hard defusing situation, and p ed3 -the probability (dependent on the leader's defusing capability) that there is an explosion given that it is trying to defuse in a hard situation.
Finally, when the leader attempts to mark the cell, it either blows up (t 17 ) with probability p em, or succeeds (t 16 ) and the team continues to the next cell. The probability p em of an explosion during the marking operation is a function of the leader's defusing capability, as discussed later.
If the leader blows up, the team elects a new leader from state LEADER. If there are no remaining robots in the team (i.e., sz=0), the team moves to BLOWNUP (t 18 ) and stutters. Otherwise, with probability p elect leader, a new leader is elected successfully and the team moves on to the next cell (t 20 ), and with probability (1 -p elect leader) leader election fails and the team moves to STUCK (t 19 ) and stutters.
We also set Row=10, and Col=12. Other parameters were varied based on the experiment. We used prism version 4.0.3, which was the latest version available at the start of this project. All our prism models, results, as well as instructions to reproduce them are available at www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu/~schaki/ discover/spin13.tgz. Experiments with success. The first set of experiments were designed to evaluate the impact of DET, DEF, LOC, T and N on success D . The results are summarized in Table 1 . We consider eight possible combinations of DET, DEF, and LOC. The first five rows are the values of success D for each of these eight combinations using T = 2 and different values of N . We observe that changing DET from LOW to HIGH has a much bigger impact on the value of success D compared to changing DEF or LOC. This suggests that using robots with good mine detection capability should be of high priority during mission design.
The next five rows show the value of success D with different values of T and N such that T × N = 30, i.e., different team configurations with 30 robots. These results indicate that using three teams with ten robots each provide optimal values of success D . Note that value of success D drops off sharply for N > 5 since small teams have a high chance of being blown up completely before mission completion.
The final column shows the average time required to compute success D over all eight combinations of DET, DEF, and LOC considered. The average is a good indicator since the standard deviation was quite low. These times were measured when we performed our experiments compositionally, i.e., computing success D for each team individually, and multiplying the results (in accordance with Theorem 2). When we used the monolithic approach, i.e., all teams composed in the same model, prism timed out at 1800 seconds in all cases. Experiments with coverage. The next set of experiments were designed to evaluate the impact of DET, DEF, LOC, T and N on coverage D . The results are summarized in Table 2 . Each cell of the table corresponds to the same values of DET, DEF, LOC, T and N as in the corresponding cell in Table 1 . Not surprisingly, we again observe that changing DET from LOW to HIGH has a much bigger impact on the value of coverage D compared to changing DEF or LOC. This suggests that using robots with good mine detection capability is a good tradeoff for not only success D , but coverage D as well.
The results for different values of T (last five rows of Table 1 ) are somewhat different. The optimal coverage D is observed for ten teams with three robots each. This reflects a subtle difference between coverage D and success D -a cell is covered as soon as the team reaches it, but that does not contribute to success unless the team avoids being blown up as well. In general, the benefit of smaller teams extends further for coverage D simply because more teams are able to "reach" more cells even if they get blown up. However, for T > 15, even coverage D falls off.
The final column shows the average time required to compute coverage D over all eight combinations of DET, DEF, and LOC considered. Once again, these times are for the compositional approach, i.e., computing coverage D for each team individually, and adding the results (in accordance with Theorem 4). For the monolithic approach, prism timed out at 1800 seconds in all cases.
We present an approach to compute quantitative utility of robotic missions using probabilistic model checking. We show how to express a robotic demining mission as a αPA, its success as a LTL formula, and its coverage as a reward. We prove a set of compositionality theorems that enable us to compute the success probability (or, coverage) of a system composed of several αPAs by combining the success probability (or, coverage) of each αPA in isolation. This ameliorates the statespace explosion problem, even when the system being verified is composed of many αPAs. We validate our approach empirically, using the probabilistic model checker prism for our experiments.
We envision building on this work in several directions. One issue is that our model for the demining mission is based on several atomistic probabilities (e.g., p fn dc0). We assume that these probabilities are available with sufficient accuracy. Otherwise, the predictions made via probabilistic model checking will be correspondingly inaccurate. As part of our ongoing work, we are developing ways to estimate these probabilities via field experiments. Another direction is to adapt probabilistic model checking to create a more generative approachone that constructs an optimal mission -that can handle an expressive range of mission configurations and constraints.
